Partisan Macroeconomic Preferences and the Diversionary Use of Force in The United Kingdom 1971-2000 by Sundin, Ludvig
Lund University  STVK01 
Department of Political Science Supervisors: Jakob Gustavsson & Jacob Sohlberg 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Partisan Macroeconomic Preferences and the Diversionary 
Use of Force in the United Kingdom 1971-2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ludvig Sundin 
 
  
Abstract 
This thesis explores the diversionary use of force in the context of The United 
Kingdom. Building on theory that suggests that diversionary tactics are most 
likely when domestic turmoil affects the core constituents of the incumbent party, 
I operationalize domestic turmoil as macroeconomic conditions that disfavor the 
core constituents of the incumbent party and test its effects on the initiation, or 
threat of, force towards other countries through logistic regression models and 
time-series data from The United Kingdom, 1971-2000. I find strong support for 
the hypothesis that high inflation during times of Conservative government 
increases the likelihood of initiation of force but fail to establish a causal 
relationship between high unemployment during times of Labour government and 
the initiation of force. 
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1 Introduction 
On April 2
nd
, 1982 the Argentinian junta invaded and occupied The Falkland 
Islands (Sp. “Islas Malvinas”), a territory previously controlled by The United 
Kingdom. To the surprise of many, the British government responded forcefully 
and sent their navy to defend the relatively insignificant islands a couple of days 
later. Though neither party of the conflict officially declared war, the conflict 
lasted for ten weeks until The United Kingdom had regained control of the 
islands. The effects on public opinion in The United Kingdom were significant 
and the country rallied around the previously unpopular Conservative government 
who easily won re-election the following year. The Falklands War has since then 
been studied by numerous scholars and arguments have been made that both sides 
of the conflict acted in the forceful manner that they did to bolster their domestic 
support. This theory is called the diversionary theory of war and has been studied 
for a long time. The case of the Falklands War is not the focus of this thesis, 
however. Instead this study will dwell deep in into the theory and mechanisms 
behind diversionary tactics. Based on the available research I will further develop 
the theory and incorporate partisan macroeconomic preferences and test my 
hypotheses on time-series data from The United Kingdom 1971-2000. 
The diversionary theory is a theory that aims to explain aggressive foreign 
policy actions by states towards other states as a reaction on domestic turmoil in 
the initiating state. A simple definition of diversionary tactics is that political 
leaders under certain circumstances employ an aggressive approach in their 
foreign policy to divert the electorate from domestic turmoil. An overview of the 
current research on the subject will be provided in the theory section along with a 
development of the theoretical arguments about the causal mechanisms behind 
diversionary behavior. While the theoretical framework is based on numerous 
studies employing different methods and focusing on different cases, the object of 
study in this thesis is The United Kingdom. I use logistic regression and time-
series data, covering the period 1971-2000, to examine how unemployment and 
inflation affects the use of force initiated by The United Kingdom and how it 
relates to which party is in office. While the object of study is The United 
Kingdom it is not a case study in the sense that I examine specific conflicts. While 
focusing on a specific state limits the possibilities for generalizations and makes 
some variables constant, most studies are either focused on The United States, 
cross-national data or are case studies limited to very specific examples. By 
focusing on The United Kingdom, my aim is to provide insights on the causal 
mechanisms behind diversionary behavior and more specifically how it is related 
to partisan macroeconomic preferences. 
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1.1 Objectives of Study 
There are numerous studies related to diversionary theory, both cases studies and 
quantitative studies. Many case studies in the past have found support for the 
theory while the empirical findings from quantitative studies have shown more 
ambiguous results. Over the last 20 years there have been an upsurge in 
quantitative studies as a result of more refined statistical methods available and 
many of the more recent statistical analyses have found evidence to support the 
occurrence of diversionary behavior (see e.g. Morgan & Bickers, 1992; Brulé & 
Hwang, 2010). Ability to do research in the field is, however, still limited due to 
lack of data (e.g. opinion poll data) and for this reason many studies are focused 
on the United States. My aim is in part to further deepen the empirical research on 
countries other than the United States, in this case the United Kingdom, but also 
to develop and further deepen the knowledge about the mechanisms behind 
diversionary tactics. I follow the example of DeRouen (2000), Brulé & Williams 
(2009) and Brulé & Hwang (2010) and use macroeconomic indicators to 
operationalize domestic turmoil as independent variables as well as controlling for 
public opinion. To my knowledge, a study including partisan macroeconomic 
preferences has never been performed on The United Kingdom specifically. Due 
to the rather different political systems in the United States and the United 
Kingdom the analysis may deepen our understanding on the mechanisms behind 
diversionary tactics and how they may differ between different political systems. 
More specifically I aim to deepen the understanding of, and refine the 
arguments on how macroeconomic factors or “the economy” is related to 
diversionary behavior. Further, I hope to provide insights on how partisan 
macroeconomic preferences affect the diversionary use of force in the British 
context.  
1.2 Research Question 
Given the objectives of the study, the overarching research question is: “How do 
domestic turmoil, operationalized as inflation and unemployment and combined 
with partisan preferences, influence the initiation of force or threat of force by The 
United Kingdom?” More specifically I aim to examine how partisan 
macroeconomic preferences relate to institutional constraints and the state of the 
economy and how those interactions in their turns affect the initiation or threat of 
initiation of force.  
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2 Theoretical Framework 
In this chapter I will define the concept of diversionary behavior and provide a 
thorough overview over the research in the area. I will focus on the causal 
mechanisms behind diversionary behavior and provide theoretical arguments on 
why macroeconomic variables play an important role and how they interact with 
partisan preferences in the British context.  Most prior research taking into 
account macroeconomic variables is focused on The United States (see e.g. Gowa, 
1998; DeRouen, 2000; Fordham, 2005; Brulé, 2006; Brulé & Hwang, 2010) and 
the measurements used of the state of the economy are often quite simply 
measured as growth in GDP. Some scholars as e.g. Brulé and Hwang (2010) have 
further developed the arguments on why macroeconomic variables matter and 
used variables such as unemployment and inflation in interaction with other 
variables to specify their models with interesting results, these results, however, 
are very specific for the American context and cannot be generalized to other 
types of political systems. The United Kingdom provides an interesting case as a 
parliamentary democracy that is an active agent in world politics. 
Diversionary theory is an extension of the “in-group—out-group hypothesis 
that states that conflict within a group can be diminished if the group is exposed to 
a common external threat (Mintz and DeRouen, 2010:129). To put it simply 
diversionary theory is this hypothesis applied to foreign policy. Morgan and 
Bickers (1992:26) concludes that foreign policy decisions in its essence are 
political decisions and therefore need to be analyzed from this perspective. This 
means that domestic politics cannot be overlooked when studying international 
politics. Basically, the diversionary theory tells us that domestic politics influence 
foreign policy. When political leaders are faced with domestic turmoil they can 
divert the attention from the domestic troubles by using force against a foreign 
enemy.  
Given that diversionary behavior is present in The United Kingdom, a central 
question is how the underlying causal mechanisms behind it work. 
2.1 Public Opinion and the Diversionary Use of 
Force 
For diversionary behavior to be rational in some sense, the actors that take these 
actions must believe that it will work or else the operation would bring costs but 
no benefit. As mentioned earlier the diversionary theory of war is built upon the 
sociological theory commonly referred to as the in-group-out-group-hypothesis 
(see Simmel, 1964). The empirical foundation of this theory is research made on 
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smaller groups and as Levy (1989:261-262) concludes it is problematic to 
generalize this theory and apply it to larger groups, such as e.g. the population of a 
country, and even to define what constitutes a group in this context. 
A common operationalization of what constitutes the in-group is the electorate 
of a democratic country (hence making the rest of the world the out-group) and 
the conflict or turmoil in the in-group has often been measured through public 
opinion polls, if the public is supportive of their leader it indicates low turmoil 
and if not the in-group is in conflict. This outline summarizes the approach taken 
by many scholars (especially the early ones) in studying the diversionary theory. 
This perspective is not the only perspective on diversionary theory but since the 
reasoning behind it is intuitively logical and much empirical research takes on this 
approach I will start by outlining diversionary theory from this perspective before 
moving on to other theoretical approaches.  
A concept closely related to the diversionary use of force and public opinion is 
the “Rally ‘Round the Flag Effect” which Lai and Reiter (2005:255) defines as an 
increase in public support for the government caused by involvement in 
international conflict. Most empirical studies of this phenomenon focus on the 
United States and find empirical support for the Rally ‘Round the Flag Effect 
(Russet & Graham, 1989:241-242). Lai and Reiter (2005) conducted a study in 
which they analyzed the impact of the use of force on public opinion in the United 
Kingdom over time, i.e. if the rally ‘round the flag effect is present in the British 
context, one of the few of its kind. Their results showed that involvement in 
international crises, which do not evolve to wars, do not lead to a rally effect. 
However, their study showed a significant rally effect for some of the wars that 
Britain was engaged in during the covered period, namely the Falklands war and 
the Gulf war. They conclude that their results indicate that rallies seem to be most 
likely when the public perceives a direct threat to the national interest, which 
would not be the case when involved in minor crises. Lai and Reiter (ibid:269) 
also suggest that these findings implicate that diversionary tactics would not be 
used since the government would find it hard to invent a credible threat that could 
actually cause a rally effect. As mentioned, however, their study focuses on the 
effects of international crises (while controlling for other variables) on public 
opinion (measured as support for the party in office), i.e. the dependent variable is 
the support for the party in office and not the initiation of conflicts. While their 
argument that it wouldn’t be rational to engage in diversionary tactics if there 
were no effects on the electorate is strong it is a theoretical argument and does not 
in itself constitute direct evidence of an absence of diversionary use of force in 
The United Kingdom.  
Before I outline the current theory I would like to state that there are many 
studies regarding this phenomenon and while many scholars find evidence that 
supports the use of diversionary tactics in democratic countries (see e.g. Morgan 
& Bickers, 1992; Gelpi, 1997; Morgan & Anderson, 1999; Brulé & Hwang, 
2010), others are more critical of the empirical evidence (See e.g. Levy, 1989; 
Dassel & Reinhart, 1999). Nor is there a consensus among the scholars that have 
found evidence to support the theory regarding the exact causal mechanisms.  
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In a quantitative study over diversionary tactics in the United States 1953-
1976, Morgan and Bickers (1992) try to explain why earlier statistical studies 
have failed to find support for diversionary theory. They argue that the 
methodology applied by earlier scholars has been inadequate and that their 
theoretical arguments have been underdeveloped (ibid:30-34). In previous studies 
the effect of the general approval rating have been examined and they mean that 
this isn’t in line with the original in-group-out-group theory and that it is instead 
the support from their core supporters that decision makers consider when making 
their decision (ibid.). Therefore, instead of focusing on the general approval 
ratings, they focus on the percentage of the electorate who state that they would 
vote for the president (since that’s what will get him or her elected). Morgan and 
Bickers (1992:34) also argue that earlier studies have been focused on war, 
instead they mean that the most likely use of force to be expected are actions on a 
lower hostility level, such as threat, display or use of force short of war, since war 
is linked to higher risks and could backfire in the public opinion. Regarding their 
reservations on methodology used by earlier scholars they claim that a linear 
relationship has been assumed. They mean that this is wrong because diversionary 
tactics is most likely to work when internal conflict is rather low. In their study 
they find support for their hypotheses and find a significant relationship between a 
decreasing voting intention for the incumbent and the probability of use of force 
(ibid:29-50).  
In another study Morgan and Anderson (1999) conducts a similar study but 
instead studying diversionary theory in the British context for the 1950-1992 
period. Their results are in line with the study by Morgan and Bickers (1992), they 
finds a negative relationship between the use of force and the percentage of the 
electorate that state that they would vote for the party in office.  
To summarize it; evidence suggests 1) The nature of the relationship is non-
linear, 2) The decision makers (the executive) seem to consider support from 
potential voters (and not general support in the whole electorate) when making 
foreign policy decisions and 3) The most likely diversionary actions are 
militarized actions short of war. 
 
2.2 The Causal Mechanisms behind the Diversionary 
Use of Force 
All executives of states are faced with constraints in their decision making. Some 
constraints are of an institutional nature (the political system as defined by the 
constitution is often stable over time, for example), while other constraints vary 
over time (e.g. support in the legislature). Numerous studies have explored the 
effects of constraints on the executive on the initiation of force. This thesis is 
focused solely on The United Kingdom and thereby I regard institutional 
constraints as constant variables. Despite being constant, these variables do matter 
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when I derive theoretical expectations and hypotheses, therefore I will provide a 
brief overview of the research on institutional constraints and the diversionary use 
of force.  
An underlying assumption of the diversionary theory is that the initiation of 
force is never the first rational option for an executive facing domestic turmoil. 
The ideal solution to domestic turmoil is of course to actually solve the situation 
at hand. This implies that the initiation of force as a diversionary tactic is most 
likely to be applied when the executive faces some kind of domestic turmoil that 
the executive for some reason can’t solve directly, i.e. when faced with 
constraints. Constraints in decision-making can of course also limit the 
executive’s abilities in the foreign policy arena and limit the ability of the 
executive to use diversionary force. There is no consensus among scholars on 
whether the constraints on the executive we typically see in democratic states 
makes the diversionary use of force more or less likely and this poses a central 
question in the studies on the diversionary use of force. According to the 
Democratic Peace Theory, democratic states almost never initiate force towards 
each other (though this doesn’t mean that they are less prone to conflict initiation 
in general) and Maoz & Russett (1993:663-624) find empirical support for the 
claim that institutional constraints have a negative impact on the initiation of force 
in democratic dyads (for similar findings see e.g. Gelpi & Griesdorf, 2001). As 
noted earlier Maoz & Russett (1993:624) points out that their findings are only 
generalizable for democratic dyads and does not provide an explanation for 
monadic democratic peace. They also conclude that earlier research concerning 
the democratic peace theory have failed to provide a solid theoretical explanation 
of the causal mechanism behind democratic peace. Proponents of the diversionary 
theory instead argue that constraints on the executive under some circumstances 
can work to increase the likelihood on the initiation of force. In a cross-sectional 
study Gelpi (1997) explores the effect of regime type on the initiation of force 
when faced with domestic turmoil and finds that the lack of institutional 
constraints in some types of autocratic regimes makes the use of diversionary 
force less likely since the executive have a wider array of options to deal with 
domestic turmoil such as using violence against opposing factions or redirect 
resources to opposing groups in an arbitrary fashion. Pickering & Kisangani 
(2005) performs a similar study and find that “…the countries with the greatest 
proclivity to use diversionary force are those with leaderships that are vulnerable 
to elite and mass pressures. Somewhat surprisingly, this condition seems most 
prevalent in deep-rooted democracies and consolidating autocracies.” (ibid:41). 
The theoretical argument here is that the constraints present in a democratic 
regime actually makes the diversionary use of force more likely since it more 
often constitutes the last resort. While findings supporting The Democratic Peace 
Theory reaches other conclusions regarding the effect of institutional constraints 
on the initiation of force, The Democratic Peace Theory in itself doesn’t 
necessarily contradict The Diversionary Theory (Oneal & Tir, 2006 provides an 
excellent example of how the both theories can go hand in hand). 
Given the support for the prevalence of diversionary tactics in the democratic 
context, a central question is what effect the system of government has on the 
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diversionary use of force. A problem when comparing presidential states and 
parliamentary states is that the vast majority of democratic states are 
parliamentary democracies and only a few democratic states have a presidential 
system (Ireland & Gartner, 2001:549). Another problem when comparing political 
systems is that there is no generally accepted classification system for political 
systems which e.g. would make it hard to place the various sorts of semi-
presidential systems in a presidential-parliamentary dichotomy (Strøm, 2000:264). 
As a consequence most cross-national research on democratic systems and the 
diversionary use of force don’t distinguish between the different systems, instead 
focusing on other key differences in governmental structure. A notable exception 
is Reiter & Tillman (2002) who distinguishes between presidential, parliamentary 
and various semi-presidential systems. Their findings, however, are inconclusive 
and they fail to establish a connection between political system and the 
diversionary use of force. Most other cross-national studies instead focus on 
parliamentary democracies and the consequences of different government 
arrangements while studies on The United States distinguish between united vs. 
divided government. Brulé & Williams (2009) explores the effects of government 
arrangements on the diversionary use of force, operationalizing domestic turmoil 
as economic decline. They perform a cross-national study (including the USA, 
treating divided government as minority government and united government as 
majoritarian government) and find that executives of minority governments are 
more likely to initiate force when faced with economic decline and that executives 
of coalition governments are less likely to do so. They also use the variable “weak 
party” to measure how party strength (i.e. the influence parties have on individual 
members of parliament) affects the initiation of force and find that executives in 
systems with weak parties also are more likely to initiate force when faced with 
economic decline. They conclude that “government arrangements (1) shape the 
extent to which the executive’s party is held accountable for the state of the 
economy and (2) affect the capacity of the executive to address economic decline 
with policy.” (ibid:790). More specifically they draw the conclusions that 
coalition governments clouds the line of accountability and makes diversions less 
likely and that minority governments and governments in systems with weak 
party cohesion are constrained when it comes to meet the challenges of an 
economy in decline and are therefore more likely to use diversionary force (ibid.). 
Smith (1996:150) reaches the same conclusion regarding the effect of coalition 
governments but attributes the effect of coalition governments to restraints in 
systems where “…the consent of many political units is required to enact 
policies”. In line with these conclusions he also concludes that The United States 
is less likely to use diversionary force under divided government (ibid.). Contrary 
to the findings of Smith and Brulé & Williams, Ireland & Gartner (2001) reach 
the conclusion that minority governments are the least likely to initiate force using 
a duration analysis. They were, however, unable to differentiate between the 
effects of majority and coalition governments.   
Parliamentary democracy is characterized by simple and indirect 
accountability and efficiency in decision-making (Strøm, 2000:286-286). This is 
especially true for the Westminster systems as represented by the British system 
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(ibid: 281). The British system, hence, is distinguished by a clear line of 
accountability and comparatively few constraints on the executive. With that said, 
there are, as in all systems, structural restraints such as elections and the required 
support of members of parliament. With a clear line of accountability the 
electorate will punish incumbents for not pursuing their policies of choice and 
research shows that while economic and social issues tends to divide parties on 
the left-right spectrum this is not the case for foreign policy issues (Mair, 
1997:24-25), making the use of force a possible diversion from domestic policies. 
I will return to the specific constraints in The United Kingdom in the next section.  
As mentioned earlier Morgan & Bickers (1992) and Morgan & Anderson 
(1999) argue from a theoretical standpoint that the in-group is constituted by the 
key constituents of the incumbent executive and that diversion is directed towards 
this group and they find empirical support for their claims. Following their 
example, to some extent, is a study by Brulé & Hwang (2010). Their study covers 
The United States 1949-1994 and they operationalize domestic turmoil as 
macroeconomic variables tied to partisan preferences. They propose that “the 
executive is more likely to use force abroad when the legislature is expected to 
pursue an economic bill that is harmful to the executive’s core constituents” 
(ibid:366). Their theory states that the Republicans’ core constituents are more 
concerned with inflation than the Democrats’ core constituents, and that their core 
constituents on the other hand are more concerned with unemployment due to 
their different demographic backgrounds. In their theory the electorate isn’t the 
direct target of diversion but instead the legislature. Under times of divided 
government the incumbent president when faced with economic challenges 
affecting the president’s core constituents (e.g. rising unemployment levels and a 
democratic incumbent) is heavily restrained in pursuing policies to remedy the 
economic challenges since the congress is in opposition. In addition to this 
members of congress might pursue policies that are directly harmful to the 
president’s core constituents. They find empirical support for their claims that 
diversionary use of force in the American context is most likely under these 
circumstances (ibid:376-377). While their findings are specific for the complex 
legislative system of The United States, some theoretical conclusions can be 
made. Their results imply that constraints on the executive make the diversionary 
use of force more likely given that the constraints restrict the executive from 
satisfying its core constituents, which is line with the findings of Morgan & 
Bickers (1992) and Morgan & Anderson (1999). It also suggests that 
macroeconomic partisan preferences might be a better specified operationalization 
to measure domestic turmoil given the theoretical argument that core constituents, 
not the general public, is central to explain the causal mechanisms behind the 
diversionary use of force. 
There is empirical support for the claim that left-wing governments are helped 
by low unemployment and hurt by high unemployment and that the same is true 
for inflation and right-wing governments in countries with a clear line of 
accountability between the executive and the electorate such as The United 
Kingdom (Powell & Whitten, 1993). Many studies on how macroeconomic 
variables affects the diversionary use of force have been made and have included 
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various macroeconomic variables such as growth in GDP, inflation, 
unemployment and quite commonly, a “misery index” that combines 
unemployment and inflation (see e.g. DeRouen, 2000; Ireland & Gartner, 2001; 
Mitchell & Prins, 2004; Brulé & Williams, 2009) and the results of these studies 
have found different and often contradictive results on the effect of 
macroeconomic variables on the diversionary use of force due to their different 
methodologies. What is somewhat surprising is that none of these studies explore 
the connection between ideology and macroeconomic preferences. Brulé and 
Williams (2009:792) recommend that future studies take this into account in the 
light of the literature on economic voting. The only study to incorporate this 
perspective is, to my knowledge, the above mentioned study by Brulé & Hwang 
(2010). 
 
 
2.3 The British Context 
The United Kingdom is a parliamentary democracy operating under the 
Westminster system. As a consequence of the first-past-the-post system British 
politics have traditionally been dominated by the two major parties The Labour 
Party and The Conservative Party. Over the covered time period 1971-2000 there 
have been no coalition governments and only a few short periods of minority 
government (1974, 1976-1979, 1997) (Paun, 2009:10-19). The United Kingdom is 
considered to have a strong party system with high party cohesiveness (Brulé & 
Williams, 2009:794). 
It could be argued that power to a high extent lies within the legislative body 
in parliamentary systems like the British one. While this isn’t necessarily untrue it 
is not entirely obvious who has the real power when it comes to foreign policy 
and the initiation of force at low to medium hostility levels. Williams (2004:916-
917) describes foreign policy decision making in The United Kingdom as 
secretive and based on conventions rather than strict rules. A consequence of this, 
according to Williams, is that “…cabinet behaves differently under different 
prime ministers and it is difficult for outsiders to gain reliable information about 
how and where specific decisions are taken” (ibid:917). Further, Williams also 
describes how decisions on military intervention have often been formulated by a 
small group around the prime minister rather than the cabinet as a whole 
(ibid:916). My conclusion is that when it comes to foreign policy and military 
intervention, the executive, by convention, has stronger decision making power 
than in domestic policy and that the executive in this context should be defined as 
the prime minister rather than the whole cabinet. With reservation for variations 
depending on which prime minister in office, the system could almost be 
described as presidential when it comes to decisions regarding military 
intervention. In other words: the executive in The United Kingdom is operating 
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under more constrains when formulating domestic policy than when formulating 
foreign policy. 
The earlier mentioned study by Brulé & Hwang (2010) is the only one taking 
into account partisan macroeconomic preferences and there are a few problems 
with generalizing their findings to the British context. First of all, divided 
government is not possible in the same sense in the British system (while it is 
possible that there are different majorities in the House of Commons and the 
House of Lords this has few, if any, implications) and the party of the executive is 
always the same party that holds the majority in the House of Commons (with the 
rare exceptions of minority governments where no party alone holds the majority). 
In the Westminster system, hence, it is not possible for the executive to “divert the 
legislature” in the same sense as Brulé and Hwang describes). This implies that if 
diversion occurs in the British context it is the electorate (or a part of it) or the 
members of parliament from the executive’s party that get diverted. Another 
central issue is whether similar assumptions can be made regarding partisanship 
and macroeconomic preferences. It is hard to find substantive empirical support 
for claims specific to The United Kingdom regarding macroeconomic preferences 
and partisanship but cross-national studies largely support the claim that left-wing 
parties prioritize to combat unemployment and right-wing parties prioritize 
combating inflation (Powell & Whitten, 1993; Berlemann & Markwardt, 2007). 
Given the historical connection between the Labour Party and organized labor and 
between the Conservative party and the capital owning class, there is no reason to 
assume that this wouldn’t hold in the specific British context. Anecdotal evidence 
such as the Thatcher government’s intense policy of fighting inflation at the cost 
of rising unemployment is also in line with the cross-national studies.  
 
 
 
2.4 Summary and Hypotheses 
The research on the diversionary theory of war is extensive and at the same time 
limited. There is neither a consensus on the occurrence of diversionary tactics or 
on the causal mechanisms behind it. The inconclusiveness of the aggregated 
theory on the diversionary use of force can to a large extent be attributed to the 
use of different methodologies and material. By drawing on the empirical findings 
that find support for the diversionary use of force I develop a model to be applied 
to the context of The United Kingdom.  
Research comparing government arrangements and the diversionary use of 
force can be viewed from two perspectives. One perspective is that countries that 
tend to have a certain government arrangement is more or less likely to engage in 
the diversionary use of force. The other perspective is that the propensity to use 
diversionary force within the same country can vary over time depending on 
government arrangements. As have been described, The United Kingdom has a 
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system that greatly favors majoritarian governments and majoritarian 
governments have dominated the covered time period. The theory is not entirely 
clear on whether diversionary behavior is more or less likely under majoritarian 
government. On one hand majoritarian government is not characterized by the 
constraints that according to theory could make the diversionary use of force more 
likely, on the other hand The United Kingdom with its majoritarian system has a 
clear line of accountability that clearly connect the incumbent party to domestic 
and economic policy, increasing the likelihood for diversionary tactics. The clear 
line of accountability, The United Kingdom’s role in world politics and the 
divergence between restraints on the executive in domestic policy vis-à-vis 
foreign policy makes me draw the conclusion that the use of diversionary of 
tactics is not unlikely in The United Kingdom.  
Following the example of Morgan & Bickers (1992) and Morgan and 
Anderson (1999) I hypothesize that the likelihood of the diversionary use of force 
is at its highest when the core constituents of the party in office are threatened by 
domestic turmoil. Drawing on the economic voting theory by Powell and Whitten 
(1993) I assume that the core constituents of the Conservative Party are more 
prone to react negatively to high inflation and that the core constituents of the 
Labour Party are more prone to react negatively to high unemployment. Thereby I 
operationalize domestic turmoil as macroeconomic variables specific for the two 
major parties of The United Kingdom. Based on this reasoning and the theoretical 
overview I derive the following hypotheses:  
 
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Governments led by the Conservative Party, when faced 
with high inflation should be more likely to initiate the use of force or threaten to 
use force. 
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Governments led by the Labour Party, when faced with 
high unemployment should be more likely to initiate the use of force or threaten to 
use force. 
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3 Research Design 
In this thesis the object of study is the government of The United Kingdom and 
the cases consists of months. As a dependent variable I use a binary variable that 
for each month is coded as either a month when there was a militarized incident 
with active involvement from The United Kingdom or not. When using a binary 
variable as the dependent variable one cannot apply a standard OLS-regression 
model because a model of that kind requires a continuous variable as the 
dependent variable (Hilbe, 2009:1). A better method for dealing with a binary 
dependent variable is the binary logistic model (Hilbe, 2009; Djurfeldt & 
Barmark, 2009; Menard, 1995). Another advantage of the logistic model is that 
it’s underlying mathematical assumptions aren’t as strict as those of the OLS-
model (Djurfeldt & Barmark, 2009:125). As Morgan & Anderson (1999:801) 
points out, a linear relationship between the predictors and the dependent variable 
isn’t to be expected due to theoretical considerations and therefore a non-linear 
method is more appropriate.  
3.1 Material  
I have chosen to study the diversionary use of force in the British context for 
mainly two reasons. The first and foremost reason is, as explained in the theory 
chapter, that most research in the area are focused on the United States of 
America or are cross-national studies. The United Kingdom makes an interesting 
object of study since the political system differs quite a lot from the American 
one. The second reason is the availability of material. I use public opinion 
numbers and statistics regarding the macroeconomic state of the country in a time-
series and that kind of statistics, collected with even time intervals over a long 
period of time are rare and exists only for a few countries in the world. I have 
accessed and gathered monthly data from 1971-2000 and use this to perform my 
statistical analysis.  
3.1.1 The Dependent Variable: Use of Force 
To operationalize the use of force in accordance with the theory I use data from 
the Correlates of War Militarized Dispute (MID) Dataset. The datasets used are 
MID 2.1EE and MID 3.1. The datasets are thoroughly explained in Ghosn et al. 
(2009) and Jones et al. (1996) and I use the data on incident level. The months 
when The United Kingdom has been involved in a militarized incident and either 
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threatened, displayed or used force or engaged in a war is coded as 1 while all 
other months have been coded as 0. The material derived from the MID 2.EE 
dataset uses the coding rules from the 3.1 dataset and provides information on 
actors and escalatory incidents (MID 2.1.EE codebook) while the 3.1 dataset on 
incident level provides information on escalatory as well as deescalatory 
incidents. The MID 2.1EE dataset provides information about incidents in the 
period 1971-1992 and the 3.1 dataset provides information on incidents during the 
period 1992-2000. When coding my dataset I have applied the same rules when 
using the 3.1 dataset and therefore the dependent variable is coded as 1 during a 
month when The United Kingdom has initiated or escalated the use of force (by 
use of force I here mean the threat, display or use of force, thereby including, but 
not restricting it to, war), and 0 otherwise. During 16.1 % (58 of 360 months) of 
the months in the covered time period The United Kingdom engaged in a 
militarized incident. 
3.1.2 Independent Variables 
To examine the hypotheses that Conservative governments reacts to high inflation 
and therefore engage in diversionary use of force and that Labour governments 
reacts to high unemployment in the same manner I use statistics from The Office 
for National Statistics in the United Kingdom. The inflation rate is measured for 
each month as the change over the last year in the retail price index (RPI) (United 
Kingdom Office for National Statistics, 2012). A more common way to measure 
inflation rate is the consumer price index (CPI), since information about the CPI 
in Britain only has been gathered systematically and monthly since the 1980’s I 
chose the RPI to be able to cover a longer time period. The inflation rate measured 
as change in RPI however should be a fairly good indicator of inflation. The 
monthly unemployment rate also comes from The Office of for National Statistics 
and is in this case measured as people percentage of the population who are 
claiming benefits related to unemployment (United Kingdom Office for National 
Statistics, 2012). While they are numerous ways to measure unemployment this 
data is used because it has been systematically collected every month since 1971. 
The data has been seasonally adjusted. I use a time lag of one month to be able to 
get a clearer picture over the causality issue. Graph 1 shows the unemployment 
rate and the inflation rate in the United Kingdom over the studied time period. 
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Graph 1 
Monthly inflation and unemployment rates in the UK 1971-2000 
 
To distinguish between months with a Labour government and a Conservative 
government I use two dummy variables, one named Conservative government 
where a month with a conservative government is codes as 1 and months with a 
Labour government coded as 0 and one named Labour government with the 
reverse coding. Even though these variables basically tell us the same thing, I 
have chosen to use both of them to make interpretation of interaction variables 
easier. As you can see in graph 2 the Conservative party was in office during 
roughly 70 % of the covered time period and the Labour party was in office for 
only roughly 30 % of the time. This means that that the sample of Labour party 
governments is rather small.  
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Graph 2 
Party in office, expressed as percent of the time 1971-2000 
 
 
 
The variables mentioned above are the most interesting variables from the 
theoretical point of view; in addition to these I add control variables for my 
statistical analysis. Since earlier theory in the field pointed to the impact of public 
opinion polling I have included a variable called voting intention. The data 
consists of monthly opinion polling in The United Kingdom, conducted by the 
Gallup poll, where the question asked to the respondents was: “Q: If there were a 
general election tomorrow, which party would you vote for? Q: If don’t know: 
Which party are you most inclined to vote for?” (King & Wybrow, 2001:2). The 
sample size ranged from approximately 1,000-1,200 respondents (ibid:1). When 
compiling my data I have used the percentage of respondents who said that they 
would vote for the party in office. The Gallup polls have been compiled by King 
and Wybrow (2001:2-20). I have done some minor changes to the material. 
During months when more than one poll has been conducted I have taken the 
average percentage between those polls to use for that month. For a few months 
there weren’t any polls conducted (often due to coinciding with a general 
election), to be able to create a time series I have used the function “linear 
interpolation” in SPSS and replaced the missing data with an average of the 
previous and the next month’s data. The same type of data was used by Morgan 
and Anderson (1999:805) and they found the variable to have a significant 
negative effect. The advantage with the Gallup data is that it has been collected 
systematically over a long period of time and statistical measures have been taken 
to make the data reliable. Graph 3 shows the percentage in the sample that 
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responded that they would vote for the party in office over time. When performing 
the regressions I have lagged the variable with one month as in the cases of 
inflation and unemployment. 
 
Graph 3 
Percentage of voters with the intent to vote for the party in office in The 
United Kingdom 1971-2000 
 
Another control variable I have used is a dummy variable for when The United 
Kingdom have been to war. Since war in itself is a militarized incident it is natural 
to see a cluster of months with involvement in militarized incidents. During the 
period the United Kingdom have been to war twice, the Falklands war and the 
Gulf war. The months when engaged in one of those two wars were codes as 1 
while all other months were coded as 0. It is essential to control for war to be able 
to draw conclusions since the risk for coincidences would be high otherwise. 
When doing this I also follow the scholars in the field (see e.g. Morgan & Bickers, 
1992; Brulé & Hwang, 2010). 
The most central variables for my study are two interaction variables created 
by the government party dummies and the inflation and unemployment variables. 
The variables are created by taking the dummy variable times the unemployment 
variable for the Labour governments and the inflation variable for the 
Conservative governments, thereby activating the unemployment variable under a 
Labour government and the inflation variable under a conservative government in 
accordance with the theory. Including interaction variables of course raises the 
issue of multicollineaerity and this will be discussed in the next section. When 
creating the interaction variables the lagged variables for inflation and 
unemployment rates are used. A list of all variables used is given in table 1.  
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Table 1 
List of variables 
 
Dependent variable: Use of force Coded as 1 during a month 
when the United Kingdom 
threatened to, displayed or used 
force, 0 otherwise. 
Independent variables: Inflation  Inflation rate measured as 
change over the past year in 
RPI. 
 Unemployment  Percentage of population who 
are claiming unemployment 
related benefits. 
Conservative government Coded as 1 in a month when 
the Conservative party is in 
office and 0 otherwise. 
Labour government Coded as 1 in a month when 
the Labour party is in office 
and 0 otherwise. 
War Coded as 1 in a month when 
the united Kingdom is at war 
and 0 otherwise. 
Conservative * Inflation  
Labour * unemployment  
 
3.2 Methodology and Regression Diagnostics 
The goal of my statistical analysis is to be able to draw conclusions regarding the 
significance of variables and the direction of the effect. The models produced are 
not intended to fully explain why The United Kingdom, or any other country for 
that matter, chooses to use force. My intent is to research if there are any signs of 
the diversionary use of force and to further explore the reasons behind this 
behavior. I will point out a few aspects regarding the reliability issue that may 
cause some concern and account for the measures taken to improve the reliability.  
As mentioned earlier one of the strengths of the logistic regression model is 
that it isn’t built upon as many strict assumptions as the OLS-model. Some 
problems may arise however. One problem is multicollinearity (i.e. when the 
independent variables are highly correlated with each other). If multicollinearity 
exists statistical inference may be hard. Menard (1995:66) warns that correlation 
above 0.80 between two or more variables may cause problems. I have correlated 
all independent variables with each other and found a significant correlation > 0.8 
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only between the government party dummy variables and the interaction variable 
Labour government*unemployment
1
 (0.965). Brambor et al. (2006:70-71) 
concludes that a common mistake among scholars in political science is to 
exclude constitutive terms in interaction models. This they mean, can lead to a 
misspecification of the model (ibid:66). The problem posed by multicollinearity is 
that it may make it harder to get significant variables due to inflated standard 
errors. This risk is preferable compared to the risk posed by a misspecified model 
which could result in significant predictors that in reality are not significant. 
Of course misspecification could be a problem anyway, as always, but I won’t 
perform any tests regarding this matter. A solid theoretical foundation and the fact 
that I test the variables in various models in different constellations should reduce 
the risk for specification errors.  
Finally, since the material consists of different time series, the issue of 
autocorrelation is a concern. I have tried to find a solution to this but haven’t 
succeeded. This problem appears to be widespread among scholars, as Oneal and 
Russett (1997:283) conclude: “The greatest danger arises from autocorrelation, 
but there are not yet generally accepted means of testing for or correcting this 
problem in logistic regression.”. This of course means that conclusions made from 
the statistical analysis should be interpreted with caution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
1
 And of course between the two government party dummies. This however poses no concern since they aren’t 
used in the same regressions. 
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4 Results 
The focus of this chapter is on presenting the logistic regression models I have 
developed and compare the results to the hypotheses outlined in chapter 2. Tested 
issues of reliability will be addressed in this chapter as well, but a more thorough 
discussion regarding validity and reliability will be provided in the following 
chapter. 
 
Table 2 
 
Models of economic indicators and public opinion and the use of force in 
the UK, 1971-2000 
Dependent variable: Use of force  
 
a 
Intercept was found to be insignificant at the 0.10-level in models 5 and 6 and therefore excluded from the 
regressions. 
* Significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test), ** Significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed test), 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test) 
 
 
Ind. variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 β 
Exp 
(β) 
β 
Exp 
(β) 
β 
Exp 
(β) 
β 
Exp 
(β) 
β 
Exp 
(β) 
β 
Exp 
(β) 
Intercept
a
 
0.76 
** 
2.13 
-3.14 
*** 
0.04 
1.42 
*** 
4.15 
-2.72 
*** 
0.66     
Inflation 
-0.18 
*** 
0.84   
-0.29 
*** 
0.75   
-0.26 
*** 
0.77 
-0.26 
*** 
0.71 
Unemployment   0.12 1.13   0.07 1.07 0.04 1.04 
-0.16 
** 
0.85 
Cons. dummy 
-1.95 
*** 
0.14   
-3.56 
*** 
0.03   
-3.13 
*** 
0.04   
Lab. dummy   
1.94 
*** 
6.96   -0.50 0.61   
2.60 
* 
13.45 
Vot.  intention         
0.02 
** 
1.02 0.01 1.01 
War         
1.93 
*** 
6.88 
2.76 
*** 
15.83 
Con*inflation     
0.28 
*** 
1.33   
0.22 
** 
1.24   
Lab*unemploy.       
0.58
* 
1.78   -0.29 0.75 
Diagnostics       
-2 log likelihood 263.972 296.797 251.115 292.688 244.700 250.077 
Hosmer & 
Lemeshow (sig.) 
0.000 0.001 0.091 0.010 0.216 0.000 
Overall 
predicted 
88.9 % 83.4 % 88.9 % 82.0 % 88.9 % 90.0 % 
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The models presented in table 2 have all been tested with the Hosmer-Lemeshow 
goodness of fit test. While goodness of fit statistics certainly can be interesting, 
the focus of this thesis is not to find a model that fully can explain why a 
government would use force, or threat of force, towards another country but to try 
to provide evidence that supports or contradicts the theoretical expectations. With 
that being noted, I will briefly assess the goodness of fit of the models. The 
interpretation of the p-values derived from the Hosmer-Lemeshow test is that a 
high p-value reflects a good fit (over 0.05) while a low p-value contradicts this 
(Hilbe, 2009:250).  
A brief look at the table above tell us that only two of the models have a p-
value greater than 0.05, model 3 and model 5. The 2-log likelihood statistic is 
harder to interpret but generally a lower number means that the fit is better. The 
overall predicted percentages show the percentage of cases (months) where the 
outcome (military action or no military action) was predicted correctly in each 
model. Since there was no military action during most of the months in the study 
these percentages should be interpreted carefully. To give an example; in model 2 
the overall predicted percentage is 83.9 %, at hand this looks like a good 
prediction but the truth is that it predicts that there will be no month when the UK 
use, or threatens to use, force. Since the share of months when force, or threat of 
force, is used only constitutes 16.1 % of the sample it’s easy to see that this 
number doesn’t necessarily tells us much. Though, when comparing the models a 
higher predicted percentage reflects a better fit which is fully in line with the other 
measurements on goodness of fit. 
As mentioned before, the most interesting results aren’t the models and how 
well they predict the outcome but the significance of the variables derived from 
the theory. Model 1 includes the independent variables inflation and government 
party as well as an intercept. Both variables are significant at the 0.01 level and 
both show a negative effect, i.e. as inflation rises the probability of use, or threat 
of use, of force decreases. The inflation variable is significant and shows a 
negative effect in all models that includes it. The dummy variable for government 
party (Conservative or Labour government, which is basically the same variable 
but is used as two variables so that I will be able to report the results from the 
interaction models in a clear way) is also significant and the results indicates that 
Labour governments uses force to a higher degree than Conservative 
governments. The unemployment variable, when used, is only significant in 
model 6 (on the 0.05 level). The results indicate that unemployment isn’t a factor 
that affects the executive’s decision to use force. 
In model 3 and model 4 I introduce interaction variables between government 
party and inflation respectively unemployment. In model 3 the interaction variable 
between inflation and Conservative government is significant at the 0.01 level and 
shows a positive effect which is in line with the theoretical expectations and 
interesting since the inflation variable in itself shows signs of an opposite effect. 
In model 4 the interaction variable between Labour government and 
unemployment is significant at the 0.10 level and shows a positive effect in line 
with the theoretical expectations. Note however that neither the Labour dummy 
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nor the unemployment variable is significant in this model and that the fit is rather 
bad for the model. 
In models 5 and 6 I incorporate the control variables mentioned in the 
previous chapter together with the interaction variables and the variables that they 
are built upon. In model 5 all included variables are significant except 
unemployment. The intercept is not included since it was not shown to be 
significant. Once again the Conservative government dummy and inflation 
interaction variable is significant, this time at the 0.05 level. I have included a 
dummy variable for the months when the UK is in a war and this variable is 
significant. I have also included a variable which, with public opinion polling, 
measures the percentage of the people that intends to vote for the incumbent 
government party. This is the same variable as Morgan and Anderson (1999) used 
for their study and while it is significant in model 5 it surprisingly shows a 
positive effect, contrary to earlier findings. As in model 3 the inflation variable is 
significant and predicts a negative influence on the outcome, unlike the interaction 
variable between Conservative government and inflation that is also significant 
(0.05) but shows a positive effect. Model 5 is also the model that, compared to the 
others, has the best fit. In model 6 the interaction variable between Conservative 
government and inflation is omitted and replaced with the interaction variable 
between Labour government and unemployment. The effects of the war variable 
and the inflation variable are roughly the same as in model 5. The unemployment 
variable however is significant at the 0.05 level unlike in the other models and 
shows a negative effect. The intention to vote on the incumbent party variable is 
not significant in this model and the dummy variable for government party is 
significant only at the 0.10 level. The interaction variable between unemployment 
and Labour government is not significant and this is not in line with the 
theoretical expectations. 
To summarize, I conclude that there is quite strong support for hypothesis 1. 
Governments led by the Conservative Party seems to be more likely to initiate 
force when faced with high inflation. This is supported by the significant and 
positive interaction variables in models 3 and 5. The fact that neither the inflation 
nor the Conservative dummy variable showed a positive effect in themselves 
despite being significant. Model 5 that included the interaction variable as well as 
the control variables was also the model with the best fit compared to the others. 
On the contrary, I find no empirical support for hypothesis 2, that governments 
led by the Labour Party when faced with high unemployment should be more 
likely to initiate force. The interaction variable was included in models 4 and 6. 
While the interaction variable was positive in model 4 it was only at a 0.10-level 
and when included in model 6 together with the control variables it was negative 
and insignificant.  
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5 Discussion  
5.1 Validity of Results 
Studying the diversionary use of force empirically is challenging. It is impossible 
to gain full knowledge about what the ulterior motives behind a certain action are. 
We can observe the militarized action in itself and we can observe the conditions 
that from a theoretical standpoint seem auspicious for diversionary behavior, but 
we can never know for sure. This of course doesn’t mean that the phenomenon 
shouldn’t be researched empirically. While it is does not provide a single 
explanation of why states engage in conflict it is a valuable part of the 
explanation. No theory can claim to have that one answer.  
The diverse and extensive research on the diversionary use of force provides 
valuable insights and in this thesis I have built upon earlier empirical findings to 
further develop the theory and apply it to The United Kingdom. My findings, at 
the least, points to interesting interactions between partisan macroeconomic 
preferences and the use of force.  
Various measurements have been used to operationalize domestic turmoil. I 
chose to follow the example of Morgan & Bickers (1992) and Morgan & 
Anderson (1999) and define the “in-group” as the core constituents of the 
incumbent and elaborated on the findings of Brulé & Hwang (2010) and the 
research on economic voting provided by Powell & Whitten (1993) to specify 
what constitutes domestic turmoil to the core constituents. Currently there is no 
best practice to follow when operationalizing domestic turmoil, but the empirical 
findings introduced in the theory chapter suggests that partisan macroeconomic 
preferences such as inflation and unemployment connected to partisan preferences 
might be a good operationalization. While not being uncontroversial it is more 
specific than most other operationalizations such as support for the incumbent 
party or the use of a “misery index”. 
All in all, with reservation for the inherent problems in studying diversionary 
behavior, I would suggest that the validity of my findings are quite solid. 
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5.2 Reliability of Results 
Issues of statistic inference were raised in chapter 4 and I can’t rule out that 
autocorrelation has damaged the results. The issue of multicollinearity was also 
raised and this was successfully avoided in models 1 and 2 which do not contain 
interaction variables. Interaction variables combined with the original variables 
leads to some amount of multicollinearity, however, as Brambor et al. (2006:70-
71) it would be more harmful to omit the original variables than to include them. 
This of course makes it harder to assess the reliability of the results and no 
absolute conclusions can be made from these regressions.  
Domestic turmoil was operationalized as high inflation combined with the 
Conservative Party in office and high inflation combined with the Labour Party in 
office. The operationalization is not evident but supported by theory. Other 
variables could have been used to measure domestic turmoil but the variables that 
were chosen had strong empirical support. On a more detailed level, other 
measures of inflation and unemployment could have been used. The choice of the 
variables that I used was made mainly due to availability, but there is nothing that 
suggests that other available variables would have been more suitable. It could be 
argued that the change in unemployment and the change in inflation should have 
been used or, at least controlled for. This, however, was beyond the scope of this 
thesis. Neither was the measure used for conflict initiation evident but due to the 
limitations in this thesis I had to make a choice and I followed the example of 
Morgan & Bickers (1992) and Morgan & Anderson (1999) and included 
militarized actions short of war.  
In summary, things could have been done to further strengthen the reliability 
of the results but due to the limitations of a thesis at this level I chose not to 
pursue this further. Despite this, there is nothing that suggests that the reliability 
of my results is low.  
5.3 Conclusions 
As outlined in the previous chapter there is strong support for hypothesis 1. Albeit 
the issues of multicollinearity and autocorrelation the results of the regressions 
supported hypothesis 1 in every way possible. The lack of support for hypothesis 
2 might be attributed to a misspecification in the model but it is possible that the 
weak support for the hypothesis could be attributed to the comparatively low 
amount of cases of months with Labour government in office.  
The strong support for hypothesis 1 and the lack of support for hypothesis 2 
does, however, constitute a puzzle. It might be attributed to the lack of data (a 
study covering more years would have provided more data), but it could of course 
also be attributed to a misspecified model. Another possible explanation might be 
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inflated standard errors as a result of the correlation between the Labour Party 
dummy variable and the interaction variable Labour government*unemployment. 
As mentioned earlier, the diversionary theory cannot fully explain why war or 
aggressive foreign policy occurs, nor is it the aim of the theory. It should also be 
noted, however, that diversionary tactics isn’t necessarily the sole cause of a 
single conflict but rather one of many. It is seldom emphasized, but diversionary 
tactics is most likely to be one ingredient of many in international conflict. Other 
factors that of course also play a role are e.g. whether there are provocations from 
other states, pressure from other super powers and many other things. It is short of 
impossible to control for all variables that might have an effect on the initiation of 
conflict and the limitations of a bachelor’s thesis doesn’t leave room for a further 
elaboration on the matter. My results, however, does not depend on the 
assumption that diversionary tactics is the sole cause, or even the dominant, of 
any given conflict. Rather, my results points to under which conditions 
diversionary tactics might play a part and how the mechanisms that might be 
triggering the tactics work. 
While the scope of this study is limited, I have identified a few variables that 
might have developed the theory further if they were included and that could 
prove to be valuable in future research. These suggestions will be presented in the 
next section.  
 
 
5.4 Suggestions for Further Research 
I have, in this thesis, considered constraints of the executive as constant. While 
constraints in The United Kingdom could be assumed to be more or less constant 
over time there are some variables that could be measured that might change over 
time. In my study I have not controlled for government arrangements due to the 
relative constant setting in The United Kingdom. There was, however, some brief 
periods of minority government during the covered time period. Given the 
theories available on government arrangements and the diversionary use of force 
this is something that should be controlled for in future studies, especially if 
covering longer periods of time. Another possible measure of restraints in some 
sense could be the size of the majority at any given time. It is reasonable to 
assume that the larger majority the incumbent has, the less constrained it is 
legislatively. Another institutional factor that wasn’t included in this study is the 
effect of election system. Election system is a constant variable in a study 
covering one country and there wouldn’t have been any point in including it. The 
findings, however, suggest that constraints on the executive works different in a 
parliamentary system than in a presidential and arguments could be made that 
differences in election systems between parliamentary countries could affect the 
constraints on the executive. In a first-past-the-post system like the British one, 
the outcome in a single constituency could affect the majority situation in 
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parliament to a higher degree than it would in a proportional system. If the 
election is close to call between the two major parties in enough constituencies 
that could be considered to be a constraint on the executive in domestic affairs. 
This should be studied further in future cross-national studies. 
Another important theoretical variable is party cohesiveness. In most studies 
where this variable is used it is used to compare party cohesiveness between 
different political settings. Hence, it wasn’t relevant to include this variable in this 
study. Bailey & Nason (2008) suggests that the conventional measurements of 
party cohesiveness isn’t applicable to measure changes within The United 
Kingdom and proposes a new measurement. While their proposal is certainly 
interesting, the data they provided didn’t cover the same time period as this study 
and to include it would have meant a lot more work. I do, however, strongly 
support the inclusion of country specific measurements of party cohesion in future 
research.  
Finally, some scholars performing cross-national research have used relative 
measures of inflation and unemployment instead of absolute measures. Their 
argument goes that constituents experience turmoil to a higher degree if the 
inflation/unemployment level is comparatively lower in neighboring countries, i.e. 
absolute levels doesn’t mean as much as the levels compared to the surrounding 
world. This is an interesting perspective that I wasn’t able to incorporate in this 
study but this should be given some thought in future studies. 
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